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Abstract: This paper discusses several challenges in designing field experiments to better 
understand how organizational and institutional design shapes innovation outcomes and the 
production of knowledge. We proceed to describe the field experimental research program 
carried out by our Crowd Innovation Laboratory at Harvard University to clarify how we have 
attempted to address these research design challenges. This program has simultaneously solved 
important practical innovation problems for partner organizations, like NASA and Harvard 
Medical School, while contributing research advances, particularly in relation to innovation 
contests and tournaments. 
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1 Introduction 
In economics and many other social sciences, the most common empirical research approach is 
one of studying natural data obtained from observational methodologies, analogous to those 
collected and studied by astronomers and meteorologists (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1985, List 
2009). Nonetheless, even in using naturally occurring data, researchers are typically interested 
in estimating “treatment” effects and causal relationships in a population of interest. The data 
provided by nature might, in this regard, simply be understood as the result of an inadequately 
designed experiment, with econometric methods being a means of “correcting” for these 
imperfections, so as to restore an ability to estimate causal relationships and to identify relevant 
model parameters. This has been achieved with varying degrees of success in the profession 
(Heckman and Leamer 2007, Imbens and Wooldridge 2008). At least in this sense, the regular 
practice and goals of empirical economics researchers might be understood as closely allied 
with those of more formal experimental research (Harrison and List 2004).  
 
However, whereas the use of formal randomized controlled trials has been the norm over the 
last 100 years in many areas of natural science, such as chemistry, physics, biology and medical 
research, prior paradigmatic views about the potential of economists to run more formalized 
controlled experiments were quite negative for many decades (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1985, 
List 2009). Only in the last two decades has there been an embrace of laboratory and field 
experimental approaches within the profession (List 2011). This rise was concurrent with and 
perhaps not unrelated to growing interest in behavioral economics, policy evaluation and rising 
standards and concern for attaining causal inferences more generally in the profession.  
 
Experimental approaches have by now gained the most substantial ground in sub-disciplines 
including behavioral, developmental and labor economics (Bandiera et al. 2011, List 2009, 2011). 
By contrast, the economics of innovation literature has generally lagged behind in adopting an 
experimental approach. In this paper we argue that the nature of the innovation process and 
supporting institutions lead to five unique challenges that raise significant barriers for the 
design and execution of innovation experiments. These challenges include: 1) The nature of the 
knowledge production function, 2) The unit of analysis, replication and sample size, 3) Selection 
and/versus treatment effects, 4) Designing (organizational) treatments and counterfactuals and 
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5) Representativeness, validity and fine-grained measures. We then proceed to discuss our 
research program undertaken within the framework for the Crowd Innovation Laboratory at 
Harvard University’s Institute for Quantitative Social Science. This program represents an early 
first step towards bringing the field experimental research method to the economics of 
innovation literature. The particular focus area of the Laboratory has been the design of 
innovation contests and tournaments, such that real-life technological problems are addressed 
while manipulating and measuring features of the innovation process. This leads us to a 
description of the approaches we have taken to attempt to address or mitigate innovation 
experiment challenges through the illustration of three examples of field experimental research 
designs.  
2 Challenges of Designing Innovation Experiments  
Whatever the field or domain, embracing experimental methods requires significant 
commitment and investment by the researcher (see, for example, Duflo and Banerjee 2009, 
Bandiera et al. 2011; List 2011). In addition to developing a theory-based perspective on an 
appropriate research question, scholars need to translate the theory to the experiment through a 
precise formulation within the observed measures and controls, design and implement 
exogenous treatments, obtain institutional review board approval, recruit representative 
subjects, ensure treatment and control isolation, record data, and then proceed with data 
analysis. Further, in the case of field experiments, researchers may require considerably more 
substantial resources in implementing and carrying out research designs. They need to gain 
cooperation from organizations in the field (e.g. an organization that provides access), assure 
that the research design is of interest to the organizational hosts, ensure that there will not be 
any harmful effects on the organizations’ operations and communicate results and feedback to 
the sponsor. These and endless other fine points create considerable “entry barriers” and 
explain, in part, the slow adoption of experiments in economics and certain other social 
sciences.  
Despite such barriers, as remarked above, considerable progress has been made in a range of 
fields—and particularly in labor economics, development economics, behavioral economics and 
consumer behavior. Experimental research in innovation, particularly research that studies how 
the design of relevant underlying institutions and organizations influences performance and 
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efficiency outcomes, lags considerably behind. Here we review five of the most conspicuous 
challenges that face empirical researchers working on these questions. These points will then 
form the basis for describing the particular approaches we have taken in a handful of research 
projects in the illustrative discussion following this section. 
 
2.1 Multiple Mechanisms Shaping Innovation—and the “Knowledge Production 
Function”  
If the theory required to explain any and all innovation phenomena and predicted patterns 
were restricted only to the structure of incentives, there might be less of a gap separating 
research on innovation and the production of knowledge versus that in other fields of 
economics . We might in such an instance simply define all desirable outcomes in relation to a 
neoclassical production function and some desired benefit function and assess individual 
decision making in relation to private costs and strategic interactions.  
 
Of course, the basic building block within the economics of innovation literature is that the 
provision of incentives influences the effort choices made by individual problem solvers (e.g. 
Holmstrom 1989, Aghion and Tirole 1994, Scotchmer 2004, Lerner and Wulf 2007, Manso 2011). 
However, innovation only occurs when problem solvers develop solutions through novel 
(re)combinations of existing and new knowledge (Schumpeter 1934; Romer 1990; Weitzman 
1998). Participants have access to an idiosyncratic stock of innovation-related problem solving 
knowledge, which is then used to develop new innovations as well as to assess the value of 
these innovations. This process is also deeply shaped by causal ambiguity in precisely how 
knowledge is produced (Rosenberg, 1982; Jones 2009). This ambiguity is associated with 
extraordinary variation in inherent productivity of different individuals and organizations 
attempting to solve innovation problems and is also quite closely related to the sometimes 
profound uncertainty regarding the appropriate paths and skills and approaches required to 
advance on a given problem (e.g., Boudreau et al. 2011). Within a context of cumulative and 
recombinant advances, where paths and relevant skills are not nearly always clear, there is 
something of a “search” process that takes place (Nelson and Winter 1982). In a context of 
multiple actors, recombinant cumulative search and high uncertainty, a number of other 
mechanisms are also often implicated in the process by which inputs are converted to outputs, 
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including sociological (e.g., Kuhn 1962, Azoulay 2004), psychological, (Amabile 1983) and 
cognitive (Boudreau et al. 2011). The stochastic nature of innovation outcomes can also often be 
a first-order aspect of the production of innovations, rather than simply a “residual error” 
(Nelson  1959). 
 
Thus, in short, the “production function” underlying innovation and knowledge production is 
anything but straightforward, and attempts to study the innovation process and how the design 
of underlying institutions plays a substantial role in shaping the innovation process must 
confront the range of mechanisms playing a role. It is often difficult or not possible to artificially 
suppress the action of certain mechanisms when attempting to study the true nature of the 
process, capturing first-order determinants—even within an experimental set-up. This creates 
pronounced challenges in formulating designs to capture appropriate end points. 
 
2.2 Unit of Analysis, Replication and Sample Size 
The nature of the innovation process implies that technical advance and the production of new 
knowledge is often not just a problem of encouraging individual or group creativity, although 
that is certainly an important element of the wider picture of managing innovation. Given the 
unavoidable role of uncertainty, factors such as diversity and strategic interactions play a role 
within the processes of innovative recombination, cumulative advance and experimentation. 
Therefore, it is in many cases not sensible to attempt to artificially isolate a lone subject and 
consider impact of a varying treatment. For example, knowledge flows and accumulation are 
inherently problems involving multiple actors, as are the range of approaches of organizing 
innovation through some form of competition or collaboration. 
 
Moreover, in many and perhaps most contexts, the choice to “enter” and engage in 
development in a particular area is itself hardly non-random and is often in direct response to 
expectations of the nature of institutions in which an innovation problem might be addressed, 
as when a scientist considers whether to work in academia or industry (Stern 2004), a 
technologist chooses whether or not to pursue a given problem or an individual solver chooses 
whether or not to join a given crowdsourcing platform to address certain problems.  
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Thus, the nature of the innovation process often implies that the appropriate unit of analysis is 
greater than the individual—frequently considerably larger: the population of innovators, or 
even the population of prospective innovators who choose whether to enter and pursue a 
problem when considering the nature of the institutions into which they will enter. The 
potentially large scale of relevant units of analysis can create notable challenges where large 
numbers of subjects may be required for just one observation, let alone multiple treatments and 
replication. 
 
2.3 Selection versus/and Treatment Effects 
Questions of treatment effects versus selection are longstanding issues—and often problems of 
econometric estimation--in all manner of empirical research in social science, as they are in 
research on innovation. The great contrast in experimental research—and its gold standard of 
randomized controlled trials—is that the raison d’etre of these methods might even be said to 
erase the “problem” of selection effects, altogether. (That is not to say that estimating the 
treatment effect necessarily implies a clear interpretation of what might be complex and 
nuanced phenomena as in earlier in 2.1.) 
 
The eradication or control of selection effects in experimental design, however, is not always 
entirely appropriate in studying innovation processes. The kinds of researchers, technologists 
and innovators who choose to work on one problem or another within a given institutional 
regime might itself be the single most important determinant of an institution’s character. We 
might also expect that the sort of individuals who are selected to a given environment (given 
responsiveness to incentives and the particular knowledge and ideas they embody, etc.) is 
highly salient in how any “treatment” effect might play out.  
 
Of course our point here is not that selection and treatment effects need always be considered 
alongside one another and that randomized controlled trials no longer have a use. Rather, 
simply that the existing use of randomized controlled trials and its emphasis on treatment 
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effects can distract from the essential role of selection as a primary – and often the most 
important – determinant of innovative outcomes (cf. Lazear et al. 2012). 
 
2.4 Designing “Institutional Design Treatments” and Counterfactuals 
Work in experimental economics, particularly behavioral and labor economics, has made 
considerable progress through isolated psychological and situational manipulations to consider 
systematic behavioral responses. However, within the innovation context, where research is 
geared towards the design of institutions and organizations that create the conditions for 
problem solving effort exertion and the resultant technological and knowledge outcomes, the 
challenge to be confronted is that a complementary set of design variables need to be 
considered simultaneously (Milgrom and Roberts 1990).  
 
It is hence rare that the most important dimensions of an organization or institution can be 
manipulated in isolation, as they are typically chosen with these other dimensions in mind. 
Take for instance that the patent system simultaneously mandates knowledge disclosures and 
monopoly rights over follow-on innovations. Thus any attempt to understand the impact of 
knowledge disclosure in innovation needs to consider both the benefits of positive spillovers 
and the incentive effects of monopoly provision.  
 
To the extent that innovation research (or any other sort of research) relates to organizational 
and/ or institutional factors, the design of treatments must somehow address this challenge. 
Researchers can either artificially manipulate a single dimension within a treatment, so as to be 
scientifically parsimonious in the definition of a treatment, or else define a treatment in relation 
to variation of multiple design variables at once, so as to reflect distinct complementary 
combinations that might have greater salience to the research question and the innovation 
phenomenon. 
 
2.5 Representativeness, Validity, and Fine-Grained Measures  
On the one hand, innovation research might be quite narrow and test quite particular 
mechanisms that might not be specific to researchers or innovators. For example, where 
research involves testing narrow mechanisms related to say the socialization of small groups, or 
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say responses to particular sets of incentives, it might be possible to test results of theory with 
subjects in a synthetic lab environment. However, to the extent that research on innovation and 
supporting institutions is meant to discover and document what may be subtle, nuanced and 
yet not entirely understood mechanisms (as in 2.1) or to the extent that the responses of 
individuals depend quite particularly on the actors under study (as in point 2.3), the nature of 
problems they solve, the particular institutional details or combinations of institutional details 
(as in point 2.4), then the question of representativeness becomes all the more salient. 
 
Therefore, a challenge in using experimental methods and apparatus is to take advantage of 
explicitly designed controlled environments. However, at the same time, there is a challenge of 
introducing sufficient representativeness so as to capture true mechanisms and to observe 
responses that calibrate to those that might be expected in the economy more broadly. This 
representativeness challenge requires close attention to the innovation tasks under study, the 
stakes to complete the tasks and the individuals engaging in problem solving activity. 
 
Core to the innovation process is problem-solving activity by innovators to overcome some 
technological challenge. Experiments in innovation thus need their subjects to engage in 
meaningful and relevant tasks, which can include generating solutions to problems and the 
evaluation of innovation proposals and projects. The core innovation tasks thus become the 
source of outcome measures to be used within the research programs. Problem-solving related 
outcomes parameters include assessing technical performance, effort and collaboration-
formation as the salient outcomes. Effort exerted in creating a solution is also used as a relevant 
outcome. This can be based on observational data, as in a count of the number of solution 
attempts made during problem solving or the problem solving activity recorded on an online 
platform. Effort can also be obtained through survey data where the subjects are asked to report 
the hours invested in creating solutions.  
 
A related and an understudied aspect of the innovation process is the evaluation of innovation 
proposals. Organizations pushing the frontiers of knowledge expend significant managerial and 
expert review resources to assess the veracity of competing innovation proposals. In many 
instances objective measures for the quality assessment of an innovation proposal is simply not 
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available (or possible) ex ante, thus creating research challenges in understanding the drivers of 
evaluation.  
 
The field experimental literature has identified the importance of relevant stakes for 
participating subjects (List 2009). Participants must be rewarded equivalently in the experiment 
as they may experience in natural settings. In the case of innovation, this requires access to 
significant resources to ensure that the stakes offered match the general expectations that 
individuals have towards accomplishing the various innovation tasks on offer and also attract 
the appropriate caliber of individuals. Stakes are important credibility signals to the subject 
pool that the researchers are serious about the outcomes and are conducting studies that will 
eventually result in some type of innovative output. 
3 Operationalizing Innovation Field Experiments via Industry Collaborations 
The precursor to the establishment of the Crowd Innovation Laboratory (CIL) was our prior 
work in understanding the factors underlying performance in innovation contest platforms like 
InnoCentive (Jeppesen and Lakhani 2010) and TopCoder (Boudreau et al. 2011). Exposure to the 
platforms, detailed knowledge about their operations, and the openness of the executives to 
pursue further studies laid the groundwork for the possibility of going beyond using 
observational data and conducting field experiments.  
 
The impetus for a systematic program to develop empirical insights on the organization of 
innovation contests has arrived from policy makers and scholars. A report investigating the 
feasibility of implementing innovation contests1 at the National Science Foundation (NSF) by 
the National Research Council (2007: page 11) highlighted that: “Owing to the limited 
experience with innovation prizes, relatively little is known about how they work in practice or 
how effective they may be as compared with, for example, R&D grants and contracts, or tax 
incentives.” Beyond comparing the relative effectiveness of the various institutions for 
encouraging innovation, several scholars have also noted that there is a paucity of empirical 
evidence as compared to the advanced stage of economic theories on the role of prizes and 
                                                            
1 We use prizes, tournaments and contests interchangeably to denote institutions for innovation 
that provide performance contingent incentives. 
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contests to induce innovation (e.g.: Brunt et al. 2011, Murray et al. 2012, Williams 2012, 
Boudreau et al. 2011). Hence policy makers and researchers, interested in innovation prizes, 
need to both understand if contests deliver superior performance as compared to alternative 
mechanisms and how behavior and actions in contests match or depart predictions in theory. 
 
The CIL’s mission is to simultaneously solve our partners’ innovation challenges while 
pursuing core social science questions through the implementation of randomized controlled 
field experiments on topics related to innovation contests. Although the theory on contests is 
relatively well advanced, empirical evidence has been very difficult to amass and has primarily 
relied on sports data to provide empirical estimates. The CIL’s work has begun to rectify this 
gap and has taken canonical theories from the textbook to the field.  
 
The stimulus to establish the laboratory came through interactions with NASA and HMS 
personnel, separately, in the executive education classroom.  Executives from both 
organizations were intrigued by the performance results demonstrated in our analysis of the 
naturally occurring data from both platforms. Both organizations requested assistance in 
developing pilot programs to assess how external innovation contests could be deployed for 
their own internal innovation challenges. We recognized this as an opportunity to use these 
pilots to explore how we could accomplish the natural science and social science mission 
simultaneously. TopCoder executives were willing to let us modify their contest platform to suit 
our experimental needs; the host organizations helped us source appropriate computational 
problems; and we raised the funds to generate the cash prizes (through generous research 
grants from Harvard Business School and London Business School). Both pilots vastly exceeded 
the expectations of the sponsor organizations in terms of the innovation results achieved and 
yielded the first ever, to our knowledge, field experiments in the economics of innovation 
literature. 
 
NASA executives in particular were interested in further assessing and investigating if external 
contests could provide a cost effective means of generating high quality solutions to a range of 
computational problems. NASA released a request for proposals for an organization that would 
assist the space agency with identifying problems that could be solved through contests, 
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designing and executing the contests, developing comparative cost assessments and furthering 
the science behind the economics of innovation contests. A joint proposal between Harvard 
University and TopCoder was successful in winning the contract and thus the laboratory was 
established. 2   
 
Since its establishment in 2010, the CIL has helped NASA run software innovation contests in 
domains as varied as asteroid detection, astronaut health applications, space station solar array 
positioning, planetary data evaluation, deep space disruption tolerant networking and space 
robotics. The passage of the America COMPETES Act in 2012 provided incentive-based prize 
procurement authority to all federal government agencies; resulting in the White House 
requesting NASA to assist other federal agencies with their innovation contest projects.  
 
The CIL has also assisted other federal agencies in designing innovation contests as varied as 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Department of Energy, the Office for Management and Budget and the US State 
Department. Overall we have helped design more than 650 discrete innovation contests on the 
TopCoder platform for NASA and its partners. The laboratory’s work has shown that 
innovation contests can be routinely used to solve computational problems within the federal 
government and at elite academic medical centers. These problems can range from the design 
and development of robust software systems to the resolution of complex computational 
algorithm problems faced by engineers and scientists.  
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the algorithmic challenges completed. The CIL has 
demonstrated significant gains in cost effectiveness, speed to solution and quality through the 
use of innovation contests. The laboratory has completed 15 challenges in life sciences, space 
sciences and advanced analytics. Thirteen of the 15 challenges achieved their objectives by 
developing solutions that either met or vastly exceeded the comparative gold standard technical 
performance benchmarks that existed in the field. Two challenges failed to create satisfactory 
solutions. The challenges typically delivered working solutions within several weeks and 
                                                            
2 Initially we were called the NASA Tournament Lab to reflect our focus on contests for NASA. Today our 
partners have expanded beyond NASA and hence the new name. 
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typically cost between $25,000 to $100,000 including reward money, platform fees and internal 
staff time. Equivalent effort within the host organizations would typically involve at least one 
post doctoral fellow and a principal investigator working on the problem for several months if 
not more.  
 
The volume of innovation contests conducted through the laboratory allows for the occasional 
development and execution of an innovation field experiment. The CIL has exclusively focused 
on using algorithmic challenges as the vehicle for the field experiment. These experiments 
involve close collaboration, coordination and interaction with relevant scientific staff to ensure 
that a suitable problem statement can be developed so that contestants will be able to develop 
solutions. Simultaneous to the technical development is the establishment of the social science 
objectives and the experimental design. The experimental design drives the changes that we 
need to make to the TopCoder platform to ensure that the scientific objectives are met. Some of 
the changes we have put through the platforms have included isolating treatment rooms to 
reduce threats to randomization, isolating communication amongst and to members, varying 
incentives, establishing team structures and team coordination, implementing various survey 
instruments and enabling search and matching amongst members.  
 
The relationship with HMS and Harvard Catalyst (HC) has also enabled the development of a 
second type of experiment that has been focused on answering fundamental questions around 
the generation and evaluation of scientific research grant proposals within the HMS context. 
Harvard Catalyst is the university-wide translational science center with a mission to drive 
therapies from the lab to patients’ bedsides faster and to do so by working across the many silos 
of HMS. A large portion of the Harvard Catalyst budget and outreach efforts for translational 
medicine is to offer grant funding to scientists. These internal grant competitions provide an 
ideal setting to investigate core research questions in the economics of innovation as researchers 
have to compete to win grants, these competitions involve evaluations and team collaborations 
dominate. The work with Harvard Catalyst has involved “layering” on social science 
randomization within the context of their grant-making. This has involved workshops with the 
relevant staff to help them understand the social science research objectives and ways in which 
Catalyst objectives are to be met. During an experiment, CIL staff work hand-in-hand with 
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Catalyst staff and scientists to manage the entire grants process. Table 2 provides an overview 
of eight large-scale field experiments designed and executed by the laboratory over the past five 
years. 
4 Case Studies in the Design of Innovation Experiments 
The earlier sections set forth a particular set of priorities and challenges in experimental 
research on innovation and the infrastructure and process needed to develop a robust 
innovation experiments platform. This might, in part, explain some of the lag of empirical 
research on innovation in embracing experimental methods. In this section, we present in the 
form of three case studies of our research projects, exemplifying possible approaches to 
overcoming these challenges, while making empirical progress. Table 3 summarizes the unique 
research design challenges, the associated solutions needed to accomplish the study objectives 
and the crucial role of close organizational partnerships in achieving our study objectives. 
 
4.1 A Research Design to Investigate “Openness” and Knowledge Disclosures 
 
This research project was designed to address two key empirical questions.  First we wanted to 
understand how the outcomes of an innovation contest compared to the results of traditional 
grant and internal efforts. Second we wanted to investigate the role of varying knowledge 
disclosure policies in shaping incentives and the innovative search process.  We designed an 
experiment to address both of these questions simultaneously.  
 
While there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that innovation contests can, under varying 
circumstances, sometimes outperform traditional (internal) modes of organizing innovation, 
direct comparative evidence is difficult to develop, as researchers need to be able to examine 
performance simultaneously under both conditions. However, developing a direct comparison 
is important for both scholars, as we need to understand issues of economic efficiency and 
social welfare, and practitioners, who need to decide if innovation effort should be exerted 
internally or through external innovation contests. The need for research on this comparative 
question became apparent when HMS researchers approached us with the possibility of 
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collaborating on understanding how external innovation contests could be used within the 
academic medical setting. We worked closely with HMS staff to identify a representative 
computational genomics problem that was challenging within life sciences and that could serve 
as means to compare contest versus internal performance.  
 
Our paper (Lakhani et al. 2013), in collaboration with HMS researchers and TopCoder 
employees and participants, shows how over the course of two weeks, more than 122 solvers 
(out of the 722 individuals who initially signed up) from 89 countries created more than 650 
solutions to the problem for a total prize purse of only $6000. The paper demonstrates that 
thirty solutions exceeded by far the NIH and internal Harvard benchmarks and the best of them 
advanced the state of the art by a factor of 1000. Figure 1 (from Lakhani et al, 2015) graphically 
illustrates the performance improvements. This performance was achieved via the contestants 
implementing 89 novel computational approaches to solve the problem, as compared to six 
approaches identified in the literature.  The resultant paper, published in a natural science 
journal (Nature Biotechnology) provided a general scientific audience with guidance towards 
understanding the underlying mechanisms about contest performance and addressing their 
concerns around representativeness through the selection of an appropriate research problem 
that was of general interest to the field. 
 
The collaboration with HMS and TopCoder also provided us as opportunity to layer on a field 
experiment that investigated how knowledge disclosure policies may impact the rate and 
direction of innovative activity (Boudreau and Lakhani 2015). Our own prior research on the 
use of crowds to solve innovation problems had identified contests and communities as two 
distinctive institutions that organize and shape participant efforts (Lakhani and Panetta 2007, 
Boudreau and Lakhani 2009, 2013). One of the most basic distinctions between a contest and a 
community is the timing and form of knowledge disclosures during the problem solving 
process. Knowledge disclosures in a contest occur at the end when details of the winning 
solutions are made public. During the contest, participants typically work in secret and are not 
aware of their competitors’ designs, and thus there is only final disclosure. In communities, the 
problem solving process is such that there is a continual sharing of knowledge about various 
solution approaches, resulting in intermediate disclosure. This fundamental difference has direct 
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effects on the rate and direction of inventive activity. Contests typically will create high 
incentives for individuals to participate and exert effort as they can appropriate all of the 
benefits of high performance for themselves. Meanwhile, intermediate disclosure in 
communities implies that participants will not have full appropriability, as others can use their 
discoveries for their own benefit, leading to depressed incentives.  
 
At the same time, knowledge disclosures also impact the search process during problem 
solving. In communities, having access to the solutions, approaches and even mistakes of others 
can provide a significant boost to one’s own problem solving effectiveness and can lead to 
convergence on the best approaches. Meanwhile in contests, one can expect search amongst 
contestants to be uncorrelated and potentially drive diversity in solution approaches.  
 
Testing the effects of varying knowledge disclosure policies on innovation poses significant 
research design challenges as causal inference requires that the problem to be solved, the profile 
and skills of the participants and the incentive schemes offered be held constant along with 
precise measures of innovative effort, performance and technological solution approaches 
developed.  In addition careful attention had to be placed on the appropriate unit of analysis, 
replication strategy and sample size.  Since our main interest was in understanding the role of 
disclosure policies we chose to apply treatments to a large “population” of solvers that could 
then choose (or not) to act within the framework.  This naturally limited replication options as 
we had to create large enough comparison groups that could allow us to infer the effects of the 
treatments on a range of prospective problem solvers – that would respond to the knowledge 
disclosure policies. Given the initial rate of signups to the problem on the TopCoder platform, 
722, we created two main (equal sized) comparison groups under the intermediate and final 
disclosure regimes and a third “robustness testing” group that had the knowledge disclosure 
policies switch from final to intermediate during the experiment.  
 
Data analysis from the field experiment on the activities of 722 participants revealed that there 
were major differences in the effort, performance and search process implemented in contests 
and communities. The intermediate disclosure treatment directly led to lowered incentives in 
the form of fewer individuals choosing to get activated and exert effort, and those that did 
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participate exerted less effort as compared to under the final disclosure treatment. (Note here, 
that conditional on the treatment, non-participation in the contest can be interpreted as an 
incentive effect of the treatment).  However, despite depressed incentives and participation, the 
intermediate treatment had higher innovative performance overall and on average. This can be 
explained by closely examining the solution approaches used by participants. Intermediate 
disclosure had the advantage of efficiently steering development towards improving existing 
solution approaches, which were already highly performing, limiting experimentation and 
narrowing technological search. Hence the disclosure policy can create altogether different 
effects on both incentives and search. We also found that the nature of the problem may be an 
important feature within the innovation contexts, as problems that may have a singularly 
maximal performance peak benefit more from intermediate disclosure approaches, while others 
that may have a rugged performance landscape will benefit from uncorrelated search. Thus 
disclosure policy is a fundamental organizing principle between contests and communities and 
more generally serves to inform the design of many of society’s innovation approaches. 
 
The results of this experiment prompted the TopCoder platform to offer a new type of contest 
structure that relied on participants initially working independently and then enabled them to 
use and borrow code from each other. At the same time, it allowed us to design a study that 
could obtain causal inference while comparing disclosure regimes that are typically occurring in 
very different empirical settings (e.g.: open source versus open science). 
 
4.2 A Research Design to Evaluate Non-Random Sorting onto Innovation Platforms 
 
A crucial distinguishing feature of innovation contest models, as compared to the internal 
innovation process followed by most firms, is that it requires self-selection to create a match 
between the individual problem solver and the innovation challenge. While managers in a firm 
determine the tasks, incentives, and the organizational structure for their innovation workers, in 
crowd-based innovation, participants get to decide which tasks they are going to work on, the 
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level of effort they are going to exert, which incentives will be most appealing, and if they prefer 
to work on their own or with others.3  
 
We investigated the importance of the sorting mechanism by conducting a novel field 
experiment on how the ability to select one’s preferred institutional regime for problem solving 
affects effort and performance in creating a solution to an innovation problem. Core to this 
study is the notion that sorting in the economy enables efficient allocation of talent and 
resources to important problems. A nascent literature in the economics of innovation and 
science has started to note that creative workers have certain institutional preferences, which 
drive their choices and effort (Stern 2004, Sauermann and Cohen 2010). This finding is also 
broadly consistent with theorizing by labor economists that differential incentive schemes sort 
and select worker effort and performance, primarily on the basis of skills (Lazear 2000).  Here 
we sought to understand how individual preferences for autonomous work or team production 
shaped the effort of participants.   
 
We worked with NASA’s Space Life Sciences Directorate to source an algorithmic problem from 
the space program and implemented its resolution as a contest on the TopCoder platform with 
a $25,000 prize purse and measures of effort and quality. Over 1000 software developers 
participated in our experiment over a 10-day period. Subjects developed algorithms to optimize 
the Space Flight Medical Kit for NASA’s Integrated Medical Model (IMM) software package. 
The problem specifically required participants to recommend the components of the space 
medical kit included in each space mission. The solution had to take into account that mass and 
volume are restricted in space vehicles and that the resources in the kit need to be sufficient to 
accommodate both expected and unexpected medical emergencies. The problem thus required 
a software solution that traded off mass and volume against sufficient resources to minimize the 
likelihood of medical evacuation.  
 
We used this problem to design an experiment that enabled us to independently assess the 
impact of self-selection and sorting into a preferred work regime (i.e. working in a team or 
                                                            
3 Of course workers initially sort into all types of organizations and jobs.   However once inside 
the organizations they are under managerial control. 
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working autonomously) while controlling for skills and incentives. Our experiment was novel in 
the sense that instead of randomly assigning individuals to teams or solo competition 
treatments, we sought to elicit preferences from a subset of our subjects as to their choice of 
work regime. We implemented this selection experiment by rank ordering all subjects based on 
their prior TopCoder skill rating and then creating match pairs of individuals based on their 
skill. We then randomly solicited the institutional preference from one person in the matched 
pair and then assigned that same choice to the other person in the pair. Hence we had skill-
controlled treatment and control conditions. We also randomized incentives in a way that some 
individuals were competing for $1000 cash prizes while others had no pecuniary incentives. The 
high number of individual signups allowed us to increase the replication of our treatments, 
with 6 to 7 groups of 20 individuals (or 4 teams of 5 individuals) working independently within 
the 2*2*2 design.  
 
Our analysis (Boudreau and Lakhani 2011) found that allocating individuals to their preferred 
regimes had a significant impact on choice of effort level. Participants that chose the 
autonomous competitive regime worked, on average, 14.92 hours compared to 6.60 hours, on 
average, for the unsorted participants. The effect was also positive and significant in the team 
regime, in which the sorted group worked, on average, 11.57 hours compared to 8.97 hours, on 
average, for the unsorted participants. Analysis of effort in terms of observable measures of 
code submissions revealed similar magnitude and significance as the hours of effort measure. 
We were also able to calibrate our results by showing that the effect size of the sorting 
mechanism was similar to the provision of pecuniary incentives in the autonomous competitive 
regime and about one third the value in the team regime. This experiment provides causal 
evidence for how an innovation worker’s preferences for their work regime drives their effort 
choices and shows that the selection and sorting effects of our institutions for innovation (e.g.: 
garage startups, academic science, large firms, open source, innovation contests) are as salient 
as their treatment effects.  In addition the solutions developed exceeded the benchmark NASA-
developed solutions by both decreasing by an order of magnitude the time required to arrive at 
the recommendation and improving the potential simulated outcomes. 
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4.3 A Research Design on the Impact of “Intellectual Distance” and “Novelty” in 
the Evaluation of Innovation Proposals 
 
Essential to the innovation process is the selection of ideas that should be given resources and 
further developed while halting work on less promising proposals. Society expends 
considerable efforts towards the evaluation task. Inside organizations, executives have to 
choose between multitudes of competing proposals (some field reports note that over 3000 
ideas are examined before a market entry is selected) and national funding bodies in the US 
allocate their billions of annual funding to an expert peer review process that involves 
thousands of scientists. A similar evaluation challenge exists for innovation contests that do not 
have access to a computer-based scoring and evaluation function; contest sponsors then have to 
rely on experts to help select amongst the contest entries.   
 
A project with HMS on generating research proposals for evaluating the outcomes of a Type-1 
diabetes research hypothesis-generation grant process provided the occasion to design a field 
experiment to understand how a relatively large panel of experts evaluate proposals that are 
close and/or distant to their own knowledge bases. A prior project with HMS and InnoCentive 
(a science problem contest platform) had generated 150 proposals that needed evaluation 
(Guinan et al. 2013). Given the diversity of topics within the proposals (e.g., causes, prophylaxis, 
biological mechanisms, treatments and care), it became apparent that a broader range of 
scientific experts would be needed to helps select the best proposals. This issue became a 
research opportunity for the CIL to design a field experiment that could potentially answer 
important questions about how experts evaluate scientific ideas. Extant literature in the natural 
sciences has mostly raised issues of ad hominem, structural, social and political factors as driving 
scientific committee evaluations (see Lee 2012, Lee et al. 2013). We were interested in 
understanding how the intellectual distance between an expert evaluator and proposals affected 
scores, while controlling for quality and other factors. We were able to recruit 142 faculty 
members from Harvard Medical School to help us evaluate the proposals. Each evaluator 
assessed 15 randomly assigned proposals and each proposal received approximately 15 scores 
from randomly allocated evaluators, generating 2130 proposal-pairs.  Note that in most 
naturally occurring evaluation settings, evaluators typically select into assessing specific 
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proposals that they are either experts in or are assigned to committees that have a specific 
research topic in mind, hence limiting identification for questions around intellectual distance. 
The proposal process was also “triple blinded” in a sense that the identities of submitters and 
evaluators were blinded to each other, and that evaluators were not aware of each other, a 
feature not commonly followed in grant processes but crucial to our research question. 
 
Our analysis shows that knowledge-based biases significantly affect evaluation outcomes 
(Boudreau et al forthcoming). Access to fine-grained data on submitters and evaluators from 
HMS, in combination with analysis of the entire medical literature (via PubMed), allowed us to 
construct measures of evaluator distance for each proposal (the degree of overlap between an 
evaluator’s knowledge (through their publications) and the knowledge in the proposals) and 
proposal novelty (the degree to which a proposal recombined knowledge in ways that were not 
present in the entire previous literature). We found that the closer an expert was to the field of 
the proposal, the harsher (more negative) their evaluation. We also found that the more novel a 
proposal, i.e. the more it contained novel recombination of existing knowledge that had not 
been published previously, the worse scores it received. Figure 2 shows the relationship 
between evaluation score and expertise distance and novelty graphically. The magnitude of 
these effects is such that they easily knock proposals from contending for funding. Our analysis 
of the data led us to ascribe these results to limits to human cognition, implying a bounded 
rationality explanation for the effects. Our paper is able to rule out as explanations both 
concerns about private (strategic) interests of evaluators and intellectual distance simply 
generating more noise in evaluations.  
 
The findings of our paper have broad implications for how resources in the sciences are 
allocated (over $40 billion is annually allocated by the NIH and NSF) and provide explanations 
for concerns in the scientific community about incrementalism. Furthermore our paper shows 
how contest evaluation processes should be designed and potentially rectifies biases that may 
occur through various types of voting mechanisms.  
4.4 The Role of Organizational Partnerships 
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As the case studies make clear, embarking on innovation experiments requires developing a 
research infrastructure that can fundamentally take ownership for delivering innovation 
outcomes for sponsor organizations.  In effect innovation experiments require “industrial scale” 
effort and resources for their successful design and execution in the following areas: 
 
• Sourcing problems: The task to be solved needs to be relevant for innovation outcomes 
and calibrated to the requirements of the organization. Expertise in both identifying 
problems and creating appropriate scoring systems is needed as part of the core research 
team. 
 
• Modifying and (re)designing research environments:  Theory often places stringent 
demands on empirical data contexts to ensure that identification and causality can be 
inferred. Hence the organizational partners and contexts need to be flexible and fungible 
to accommodate research requirements.  This includes making changes to platforms and 
internal processes to ensure that treatments can be executed and that the requirements 
of randomization, replication and participant isolation can accomplished. 
 
• Access to a subject pool: The sine qua non of innovation experiments is access to 
subjects that can partake in innovation-related problem solving.  Organizational 
partners have to able to provide the research team with a sufficient number of subjects 
that can undertake the innovation task at hand and provide detailed information about 
their skills, abilities and backgrounds to allow for experimental allocation to treatments 
and ex post controls during analysis and interpretation.   The ability to host, interact and 
manage hundreds if not thousands of subjects in both online and offline settings is 
needed during the experiment design and execution phases. 
 
• Operational infrastructure, personnel and resources: Innovation experiments also need 
to be actively managed from the design through the execution phase.  The research team 
needs to be able to interface with sponsor organizations on an ongoing basis during the 
design phase to ensure that both the research objectives and the practical organizational 
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requirements are being met.  The execution phase requires close monitoring of the 
experimental environment and flexibility and imagination in developing solutions to 
unforeseen circumstances.  Researchers of course also need resources to fund the staff 
and temporary personnel needed to design and run the experiment and for “payments” 
for the innovation tasks accomplished by the subjects. As Table 2 shows, simply the 
“prize” funding for our experiments have ranged from $6000 to $800,000 and this has 
typically been achieved by the sponsor organization providing the funds. 
 
Overall the design and execution of innovation experiments requires a very high degree of trust 
between the research team and the sponsoring organization.  In our experience, achieving this 
trust entailed scoping out appropriate and achievable initial objectives that met the 
requirements of the sponsors, e.g.: initiating small pilot projects to prove that effective solutions 
can be developed and that the research teams have the ability to collaborate, and then following 
up with more ambitious projects. The initial acts of trust required investment on our part in 
time, effort and resources, without the guarantee that a viable research project could be 
developed. 
5 Insights for Policy 
 
Two sets of implications for policy implied by the earlier discussion include (1) how 
policymakers and researchers can fund, sponsor and use field experiments; and (2) the role of 
contests in innovation procurement. As we earlier argued and illustrated with examples, 
researching innovation comes with particular challenges. These create additional burdens for 
innovation research with experiments, although perhaps at the same time providing added 
returns. In particular, the research infrastructure and sponsor organizational relationships (and 
trust) required to execute innovation experiments is quite labor intensive and requires resources 
that are not commonly available through conventional funding arrangements. Although formal 
field experiment laboratories that tie practical outcomes to economic theory and analysis are 
increasingly common in development economics, to the best of our knowledge the CIL (and our 
related efforts in field experiments) is unique within the field of economics innovation.  
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However, given the importance of innovation and knowledge production to economic growth, 
it is incumbent on the scholarly, policy and funding communities to catalyze research that 
diligently develops a “science of innovation” that is empirically informed through field-based 
randomized control trials. Policy makers and government agencies can play an important role 
funding and supporting field experimental research on innovation and making more 
programmatic attempts to develop collaborations between empirical economists and 
government agencies pursuing innovation.  Economists can also push towards creating research 
infrastructure that enables them to work hand-in-hand with organizations engaged in 
innovation activities to take a scientific approach towards applying various theoretical and 
practical levers that improve research productivity.  Given the very large footprint of federal 
and industrial research and development activities there will be many opportunities for 
scientific collaborations between academia, government and industry on this topic.  
 
Our research has also most practically shown that innovation contests can be used routinely to 
procure innovation and technology. The development of a complex multi-state, multi program 
information technology solution for Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) serves as 
an example for the cost, speed and quality results arising from the use of innovation contests. 
The CMS program served to create a new software application suite that would assist in 
screening and registering health care providers for state run Medicaid programs. The aim was 
to better facilitate the screening of health care providers while at the same time lowering the 
burden on providers and reducing administrative and infrastructure expenses for states and 
federal programs.  Ideally, this application would be able to ease provider enrollment processes 
while also identifying and preventing “bad actors” from enrolling as providers in state 
Medicaid programs and thus reduce fraud. The system also had to be backwards compatible 
with existing legacy systems and use modern shared and cloud-based information 
technologies.  The CIL, with TopCoder, ran more than 140 contests, involving 1500 participants 
from over 35 countries to develop the application within nine months. Quality of the solution 
developed was judged to be above the standards typically followed by the traditional IT 
contractors, and cost analysis by CMS program managers revealed that a comparable system 
from a traditional vendor would cost $6 million as compared to the $1.5 million in charges to 
develop through innovation contests. Furthermore, the administrative cost of running and 
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supporting a traditional procurement system was estimated at $1.4 million, as compared to less 
than $90,000 for the contest model. Thus the overall difference in cost, as estimated by CMS 
staff, was estimated to be on the order of $4.9 million (Garner and Wood 2013). 
 
The policy challenge now is to understand how innovation contests can become a routine part 
of federal procurement for technology. The academic and policy establishments take for granted 
that traditional contractor-based procurement or research grants to academic institutions are the 
preferred modes for encouraging innovative outcomes.  Our research approach has begun to 
provide some initial evidence that innovation contests may also be a viable option to sourcing 
technology.  Although the America COMPETES Act provides a framework for US agencies to 
pursue prize-based contests in procurement, there is a significant lag between the spirit of the 
legislation and its adoption within the government agencies.  Policy makers now have the 
opportunity to conduct systematic assessments of contests, grants and contracts as vehicles to 
drive innovation and can direct efforts so that the internal organizational resistance to a “new” 
way of procuring technology does not trump the importance of running careful counterfactual-
based economic assessments.  
6 Conclusion 
 
Experiments have now become a standard approach to deriving insights in economics along 
with formal modeling and econometric analysis of observational data.  In this paper we have 
sought to highlight the particular challenges faced by the economics of innovation literature to 
implement experiments.  In particular we argued that the very nature of the innovation process 
and the surrounding organizations and institutions that support it raise non-trivial entry 
barriers to researchers interested in the experimental approach.  We then provide the rationale 
and design of a systematic program and associated laboratory that has designed and executed 
innovation experiments within the context of contests in close partnership with NASA, Harvard 
Medical School, and the TopCoder online innovation platform.  The laboratory’s mission is to 
solve our partners’ innovation problems while simultaneously undertaking randomized control 
trials on topics related to innovation contests. 
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The literature on contests is probably one of the most well-advanced and sophisticated 
theoretical subfields within economics.  Over the last decade contest theory has escaped journal 
articles and textbooks and has been implicitly implanted within several large-scale innovation 
platforms that routinely offer contests as the primary incentive scheme to hundreds of 
thousands of participants. In addition, academic funding mechanisms can also be viewed 
within the contest framework. This provides a unique opportunity for economics of innovation 
scholars to deploy field experimental methods to answer questions on both the optimal design 
of innovation contests and the general workings of innovation systems.  Field experiments have 
the potential to provide unambiguous causal evidence on innovation topics while 
simultaneously assisting organizations with their innovation problems.  We encourage our 
colleagues to complement their existing econometric-driven empirical research with exploration 
of how to deploy field experiments on questions of their own interest.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 Accuracy score vs. speed of contest-commissioned immunoglobulin sequence annotation code  
 
Source: Lakhani et al. 2013 
Note: Circle represents contest entry. Square is Harvard code. Triangle is NIH MegaBlast code. 
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Figure 2 – Impact of intellectual distance on evaluation scores 
 
 
 
 
Source: Boudreau et al. forthcoming 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Computational Algorithmic Challenges Completed by Crowd Innovation Laboratory  
Challenge Sponsor Prize 
Amount 
Number of 
Contestants 
(Submissions) 
Time Length 
(Days)! Performance Results 
Computational+Biology+
Antibody Sequencing  HMS $6,000 122 (654) 14 Exceeded benchmark results from HMS and NIH. Three orders of 
magnitude improvement. 
  Classification!of!Minority!Variants!in!Pooled!HIV!Sequencing HMS $5,000 196 (668) 14 Exceeded HMS benchmarks. Classification now possible at 0.1% versus previously at >0.5%. 
Antibody Clustering Scripps /NASA $8,500 40 (214) 7 Exceeded Scripps benchmarks. Four orders of magnitude improvement. 
Knowledge Extraction via Natural 
Language Processing for PubMed 
Articles 
Scripps/NIH 
/NASA 
$30,000 82 (1700) 8 Exceeded Scripps/NIH “F-measure” (precision and recall) improved by 
5%.  
Chemical Toxicity Prediction EPA /NASA $10,000 47 (783) 14 Improve EPA internal model by 20%. 
Cyano Bacterial Modeling ! EPA/NASA! $15,000 30 (460) 21 Source problem, develop scoring algorithm, modify TopCoder platform & 
deliver solutions.!
+ + + Aerospace+Sciences++
International Space Station Longeron  NASA! $30,000 459 (2009) 21 Design and develop innovation competition for MGH. !
Asteroid Data Hunter I! NASA! $10,000 60 (301) 
 
14 Reduce false positives by an order of magnitude.!
Asteroid Data Hunter 2 NASA $20,000 47 (256) 14 Increased asteroid detection by 15% compared to benchmark algorithm. 
Asteroid Tracker NASA $15,000 43 (299) 14 Met current benchmarks and established proof of concept for algorithmic 
performance 
Planetary Data Systems – Saturn Cassini 
Mission 
NASA $25,000 15 (255) 14 New algorithm to detect propeller objects in the rings of Saturn. 
Identification of objects up by 30% with 80% accuracy. 
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Satellite!Image!Detection! NASA/UCSD! $15,000 39!(357) 21 Reduced!need!for!human!labeled!data!and!matched!manual!performance.!
Advanced+Analytics+Image!and!Text!Analysis!in!Patent!Documents! NASA/US!PTO! $50,000 140!(1797) 30 De#novo#algorithm!for!automated!detection!of!patent!images,!parts!and!related!text. Predicting!Probability!of!Atrocity!Events!using!News!Data! NASA!/!USAID! $25,000 93!(592) 21 De#novo!algorithm!that!outperforms!naive!frequency!based!predictions!of!human!rights!violations!by!60%.!
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Table 2: Innovation Field Experiments by Crowd Innovation Lab at Harvard Institute for Quantitative Social Science 
 
Sponsor / 
Platform 
N Innovation Objectives Research Questions Key Challenges 
1.HMS / 
TopCoder 
722 Develop sequence alignment 
algorithm for genomics application 
($6,000 prize pool). 
How do disclosure regimes impact the rate and 
direction of innovative activity (contests versus 
communities)? 
Source problem, develop scoring algorithm, 
modify TopCoder platform & deliver solutions. 
2.NASA / 
TopCoder 
1200 Develop algorithm to create most 
optimal space medical kit for long-
term space journeys ($25,000 prize 
pool). 
How does self-selection into autonomous work 
versus team production drive effort and 
productivity? 
Source problem, develop scoring algorithm, 
modify TopCoder platform & deliver solutions. 
3.HMS / 
InnoCentive 
294 Generate and evaluate new research 
for treating Type 1 Diabetes by 
engaging Harvard and rest of world 
($30,000 & $1,000,000 in grant 
funding). 
How can innovation contest mechanisms be applied 
to academic medical centers? 
 
How does evaluator expertise and knowledge impact 
the scoring of frontier science projects? 
Design and execute a new grant process that 
enables new participants to contribute. 
Develop and execute a randomized and triple-
blinded evaluation process that enables grants to 
be awarded. 
4. HMS / HBS 
iLab 
450 Encourage scientific proposals in 
advanced medical imaging across 
Harvard and help facilitate new 
collaborations ($800,000 in grant 
funding).  
How do search costs impact the formation of 
scientific collaboration? 
 
How do peer reputation incentives impact scientific 
effort? 
Design and execute an end-to-end new grant 
process that can build imaging community across 
Harvard. 
Identify & qualify population of potential 
participants, design & administer randomized 
information sharing sessions at HBS iLab, establish 
and coordinate grant submission requirements, 
drive evaluation of proposals. 
5. NASA /  
TopCoder / 
Google 
1000 Develop algorithms for autonomous 
space transportation robots ($35,000 
prize pool). 
What is the role of explicit peer and job market 
signals as compared to pecuniary incentives in a 
contest setting? 
Source problem, develop scoring algorithm, 
modify TopCoder platform & deliver solutions. 
Attract Google and NASA JPL laboratory as 
sponsors to generate job market signals. 
6. US Patent 
Office / 
TopCoder 
1000 Develop image and text detection 
algorithms for US Patent Office 
($50,000 pool). 
What are the costs and benefits of self-organization as 
opposed to centralized assignment into teams? 
Source problem, develop scoring algorithm, 
modify TopCoder platform & deliver solutions. 
7. HMS / 
MGH 
350 Create an internal contest for MGH 
Cardiac Center staff to generate 
innovation proposals. 
How do extrinsic, intrinsic and pro-social incentives 
drive participation and effort in an internal solution 
generation contest? 
Design and develop innovation competition for 
MGH. 
 
8. NASA / 
Scripps 
299 Improve NIH natural language 
processing algorithms. 
How do races and tournaments differ? 
 
Source problem, develop scoring algorithm, 
modify TopCoder platform & deliver solutions. 
 
Innovation Experiments 
 36 
Table 3 – Summary of Key Design Challenges and Solutions in Innovation Experiment Case Studies Key!Experimental!Design!Challenges! Study!1:!Openness!and!Knowledge!Disclosure!(Lakhani!et!al.!2013,!Boudreau!and!Lakhani!2015)! Study!2:!Non^random!Sorting!in!Innovation!Contest!Platforms!(Boudreau!and!Lakhani!2011)! Study!3:!Intellectual!Distance!and!Novelty!in!Scientific!Evaluations!(Boudreau!et!al.!forthcoming)!
Mechanisms* ! Comparative!performance!of!innovation!contests!versus!internal!and!grant^based!research!
! The!role!of!knowledge!disclosure!policy!in!incentives!to!innovate!and!the!nature!of!the!innovative!search!process!!
! Preference!for!autonomous!versus!team!work!drives!effort!and!performance!in!innovation!contests!while!accounting!for!skills!and!pecuniary!prizes!
! The!role!of!intellectual!distance!and!the!recombinatorial!nature!of!knowledge!in!systematically!affecting!the!evaluation!of!scientific!ideas!while!controlling!for!other!forms!of!ad!hominem!biases!
Unit*of*Analysis/Replication/Sample*
Size*
! Population!level!technological!performance!and!effort!measures!
! Individual!performance!achievements!
! Knowledge!sharing!at!population!level!
! Recombinatorial!analysis!of!knowledge!approaches!used!to!create!software!solutions!
! Limit!replication!to!study!population!level!policy!effects!by!increasing!sample!size!in!large!treatment!groups!
! Individual!and!team!level!analysis!
! Individual!and!team!level!effort!and!performance!measures!
! Allow!for!multiple!replications!of!treatment!and!controls!–!encourage!broad!entry!!
! Evaluation!scores!of!research!proposals!as!key!driver!
! Measure!distance!between!proposal!and!evaluators!
! Measure!novelty!based!on!all!publications!in!PubMed!
! Assure!multiple!evaluators!per!proposal!and!multiple!proposals!evaluate!by!each!evaluator!
! (150!proposals,!142!evaluators!|!Each!proposal!gets!15!evalutions)!
Selection/Treatment*Effects* ! Population!level!disclosure!treatment!allows!for!interpreting!non^response!as!an!incentive!effect!
! Design!study!as!a!“selection”!experiment!
! Create!treatments!that!allow!for!selection!and!matched!pair!allocation!to!autonomous!versus!team!settings!
! Randomly!allocate!proposals!to!evaluators!to!derive!variation!in!intellectual!distance!between!evaluator!and!proposals!
Innovation*Institution*Treatments* ! Knowledge!disclosure!bundles!informational!and!motivational!effects! ! Allow!autonomous!and!team!production! ! Replicate!NIH!and!HMS!evaluation!metrics!while!ensuring!that!evaluators!do!not!contaminate!each!other!by!sharing!evaluations!
! Separate!out!research!hypothesis/idea!from!
Innovation Experiments 
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proposal!feasibility!
Representativeness* ! Innovation!problem!solved!of!key!interest!to!biomedical!research!community!
! Quality!scoring!of!solutions!based!on!life!sciences!research!objectives!
! Solvers!have!background!used!by!field!organizations.!Skills!representative!of!researchers!in!field!
! Prizes!($6000)!in!line!with!platform!specific!rewards!
! Choose!NASA!problem!with!clear!and!objective!performance!goals!
! Instrument!scoring!system!to!enable!objective!measurement!
! Offer!large!prizes!($25,000!pool)!to!drive!participation!to!enable!replication!and!large!sample!size!!
! Subject!skills!match!profile!of!programmers!typically!used!to!solve!problems!in!organizations!
! Solicit!proposal!from!university!researchers!
! Recruit!evaluators!from!medical!school!faculty!
! Follow!standard!evaluation!metrics!
! Offer!significant!rewards!for!proposal!success!($25,000!combined!reward!pool)!
 
 
 
